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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN B. GARSIDE and 
BETTY B. GARSIDE, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
DE LOYD HILLSTEAD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10364 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appeal limited by order of this Court to sole issue of 
whether Court abused its descretion in denying motion to 
set aside judgment by default for damages from auto 
accident after service in accordance with Utah Non-Res-
ident Motorist Statute. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant appeals alleging abuse of discretion in deny-
ing his motion to set aside default judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGH ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs submit that the Court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying Defendant's motion, accordingly the 
order denying that motion should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts submitted by Defendant in his 
brief is largely unsupported by the record and therefore 
cannot be considered by the Court. Rule 75 (p) (2) (2) 
(d), URCP. The material facts as shown by the record 
are as follows: 
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On August 12, 1961, the Defendant drove his auto-
mobile into the rear of the automobile occupied by the 
Plaintiffs and owned by Plaintiff John B. Garside caus-
ing extensive damage to the automobile and injury to the 
occupants. (R.10-15). Plaintiffs underwent extensive 
treatment for a long period of time for their injuries 
which ultimately resulted in the late Dr. Snow perfonn-
ing surgery on Betty Garside's neck and John Garside's 
knee cap, and in permanent partial disability to Plaintiffs. 
(R. 12-14) Plaintiffs were unable to determine the ex-
tent of their injuries for a long period of time while they 
underwent various treatments (R. 12-14) and accordingly 
waited until the extent of the injuries were determined 
to file this action. 
Jurisdiction over the Defendant was obtained in strict 
compliance with the Utah Non-resident motor vehicle 
statute ( 41-12-8, UCA, 1953 and related statutes) (R. 4 -
6D) and after hearing testimony from both Plaintiffs and 
from the late Dr. Burke McArthur Snow, (R. 7) an Orth-
opedic Surgeon who treated and performed surgery upon 
both Plaintiffs, Judge Marcellus K. Snow on Novem-
ber 10, 1964, granted judgment (R. 7-8) for a sum sub-
stantially smaller than prayed for in Plaintiffs' complaint 
(R. 2-3). Doctor Snow was killed in an airplane crash 
shortly after he testified in this matter. 
Defendant claims in his brief (P. 3) that he did not 
receive a copy of the summons and complaint and that 
his first notice of the judgment was a letter sent to De-
fendant January 1, 1965, (although these alleged facts do 
not appear in the record before the court) and that he 
acted promptly in filing his motion to set aside the judg-
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ment (Defendant's brief P. 3, 10) although the motion 
was not filed until February 26, 1965. (R. 18) Judge Snow 
denied Defendant's motion (R. 20) and Defendant ap-
pealed to this Court (R. 21). The appeal was limited to 
the question of alleged abuse of discretion by Judge Snow 
in a hearing before this court on Plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss the appeal. A substantial portion of Defendant's 
brief is devoted to a discussion of the non-resident motor 
vehicle statute and to other matters outside of the scope 
of this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE SNOW'S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE PLAINTIFFS' 
JUDGEMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
This Court limited the issues in this appeal to the 
" ... question of denial of motion to set aside default 
judgment." (See order of July 23, 1965). Judge Snow 
properly denied Defendant's motion to set aside the de-
fault judgment awarded in favor of Plaintiffs and his 
order should be affirmed by this Court. Arguments raised 
by Defendant are discussed as follows: 
(a) Questions of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect are not before the Court. Rule 60 (b) 
quoted by Defendant in his brief (P. 4-5) limits the time 
within which a motion to set aside a judgment on 
grounds specified in sub-paragraph ( 4) of mistake, inad-
vertance, surprise, excusable neglect or the other grounds 
specified in sub-paragraphs ( 1) through ( 4) to three 
months after the judgment was taken. Defendant ac-
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knowledges that he had actual notice of the judgment 
over a month before the expiration of the three month 
period within which time he could have filed a motion to 
set aside the judgment on said grounds, (R. 3) but De-
fendant failed to file his motion until after the three 
month period had expired. Sub-paragraph (7) of that 
rule which is also relied upon by Defendant in his brief 
(P. 5) contains no time limit within which a motion to 
set aside a judgment may be filed. Sub-paragraph (7) of 
Rule 60 (b) permits the Court to set aside a judgment 
for" ... any other reason justifying relief from the oper-
ation of the judgment." The words "other reason" used 
in that subdivision following the specific enumerations 
contained in the other six sub-paragraphs excludes con-
sideration of the grounds enumerated in the preceding 
sub-paragraphs. Accordingly, the issues of mistake, in-
advertance, surprise, or excusable neglect urged by the 
Defendant as reason for setting aside the judgment can-
not be considered by the Court. Defendant's argument in 
support of his motion to set aside the judgment is largely 
based upon subdivision ( 4) of Rule 60 ( b) and in essence 
contends that the judgment should be set aside unless 
Defendant is guilty of "inexcusable neglect." (Brief P. 4-
10) However, the rule and cases clearly show that the 
burden is upon the Defendant to establish that he is en-
titled to the relief requested, and that the burden is not 
on the Plaintiff to show that Defendant is in fact guilty 
of "inexcusable neglect" even in instances where that is 
properly an issue before the court (and this is not an 
issue in our case since the motion was filed too late). 
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(b) Application to set aside judgment was not made 
timely. A copy of the summons and complaint were 
mailed to Defendant September 12, 1964, at the address 
furnished by him at the time of the accident, which ad-
dress was the last address of Defendant known to Plain-
tiffs. (R. 4-5) Defendant failed to appear and answer and 
on October 6, 1964, after hearing sworn testimony from 
both Plaintiffs and from the late Dr. Snow, the Ortho-
pedic physician who treated and performed surgery upon 
both Plaintiffs, Judge Snow granted judgment. (R. 7-15) 
The judgment was actually entered November 10, 1964. 
(R. 7) Defendant filed his motion to set aside Plaintiffs' 
judgment February 26, 1965. (R. 18) 
Defendant claims that the reason for the " . . . time 
lapse between the granting of the judgment and De-
fendant's motion to have it set aside" (brief P. 10) was 
the alleged " ... conduct of Plaintiffs and their counsel 
in delaying two months before sending Defendant a letter 
advising of the default judgment ... " If we accept De-
fendant's gratuitous statement (unsupported by the rec-
ord before the court) that Defendant received a letter 
about January 1, 1965, advising him of the judgment and 
that he immediately notified his insurance carrier (Brief 
P. 3), the facts are as follows: 
( 1) Approximately 52 days passed after the date of 
entry of judgment to the date that Defendant received 
notice of that judgment. 
(2) Approximately 56 days passed after the date De-
fendant was notified of the judgment to the date upon 
which Defendant filed his motion to set aside the judg-
ment. 
6 
(3) Defendant had approximately 40 days within 
which to file his motion to set aside the default judgment 
after he learned of the judgment and before the expira-
tion of the three month limit specified by Rule 60 (b). 
The cases are uniform in requiring that the moving 
party show that he has used due diligence and made 
timely application to set aside the judgment. Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Company et al., 260 P.2d 741; Peter-
son v. Crozier, 29 U. 235, 81 P. 860. It appears, from De-
fendant's brief (P. 3) that Defendant's insurance carrier 
is the real party in interest and it is not a resident of 
California and cannot claim that the distance between 
Utah and California caused delay in filing of their motion 
to set aside the judgment. From the foregoing facts it 
is rather obvious that the Defendant and his insurance 
carrier did not use due diligence or make timely applica-
tion after they learned of the judgment. 
( c) Defendant was not entitled to notice of judgment. 
Defendant complains at length (Brief P. 3) that he had 
no notice of the lawsuit or of the judgment until about 
January 1, 1965, when they allegedly received a letter 
from Plaintiffs' attorney at an address different from the 
address to which the original summons and complaint 
were mailed (Brief P. 3), however, there is absolutely 
nothing in the record before the Court to support De-
fendant's claim that they had no notice of the suit or 
judgment except the unverified bare statement of coun-
sel contained in Defendant's motion to set aside Plain-
tiffs' judgment (R. 18). There is absolutely nothing in 
the record to support the allegation made by Defendant 
in his brief (P. 3) that the notice of judgment was mailed 
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to a different address from the address to which the sum-
mons and complaint were mailed (R. 4-5). Plaintiffs were 
not required by law to give Defendant any notices ex-
cept the mailing of the summons and complaint. (R. 4-5). 
Rule 55(a) (2), URCP provides in part as follows: 
"Notice to Party in Default. After the entry of the 
default of any party, as provided in subdivision (a) 
( 1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such 
party in default any notice of action taken or to be 
taken or to serve any notfce or paper otherwise re-
quired by these rules to be served on a party to the 
action or proceeding . . . " (emphasis added) 
( d) Actual receipt of summons and complaint by De-
fendant is not required under Utah Non-Resident Motor-
ist Statute. The pertinent provisions of 41-12-8, UCA, 
1953, are quoted in Defendant's brief (P. 11). The only 
requirements of this statute, to obtain jurisdiction over a 
non-resident operator of a motor vehicle who is involved 
in an accident in Utah, are: 
( 1) Service of process upon the Secretary of State. 
(2) Mail notice of such service and a copy of the 
process to the non-resident motorist at his last known 
address within 10 days after such service. (emphasis 
added). 
The Utah Statute is unique in that there is no require-
ment that the notice be sent by registered mail or that 
any other means be used to determine whether the non-
resident motorist actually received the notice. Our 
statute expressly negatives the requirement of actual 
notice and states that " ... such service shall be sufficient 
service ... " if the two foregoing requirements are ful-
filled. 
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The non-resident motorist statutes of most other states 
require that notice be sent by registered mail and many 
require that proof of actual receipt by the non-resident 
motorist be filed with the Court. Generally the Courts 
have held that a requirement that a notice be sent by 
registered mail is not a requirement that the notice ac-
tually be received by the non-resident. See annotation at 
95 ALR2d 1036, etc. Certainly our statute which permits 
mailing by ordinary mail contains no requirement that 
the notice be actually received by the non-resident motor-
ist. To rule otherwise would enable a non-resident de-
fendant to evade service of process by simply giving a 
false address or by moving from the address given to law 
officers and injured persons without leaving a forward-
ing address. Conner v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 313, 43 Ohio 
Ops 212, 96 NE2d 13, Williams v. Egan, (1957 Okla) 308 
P.2d 273, 95 ALR2d 1036. 
If the legislature had intended that actual notice to a 
non-resident motorist were required to obtain jurisdic-
tion that requirement would have been included in the 
statute. Our case is substantially different from the pos-
sible oppressive situation contemplated in the separate 
concerring opinion of Justice Henroid in Teague v Dis-
trict Court, 4 U.2d 147, 289 P.2d 331, 53 ALR2d 1159 
where it is suggested that a person might deliberately 
refrain from serving summons during a period while he 
had ample opportunity to do so, then assert an unmer-
itorious case when he was sure that the other party was 
far away and unable to protect himself. In our situation 
there is no evidence that the non-resident Defendant re-
mained in the State of Utah for any period of time or 
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that Plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to serve him 
while he was in Utah. The reasons for delay in filing the 
suit are readily explained by the extensive treatment 
required to determine the extent of the injuries (R. 12-
14) and Defendant's insurance company was available to 
protect its interests. Our case is precisely the type of 
situation contemplated by the legislature when it enacted 
the non-resident motorist statute and, having fully com-
plied with the requirements of that statute, the Plaintiffs 
are entitled to retain and enforce their judgment. 
A situation similar to non-resident motor vehicle 
statute has long existed in the case of service of summons 
upon process agent of a foreign corporation with no actual 
notice of the suit being conveyed to the corporation until 
after entry of judgment by default. The courts have been 
quite uniform in denying relief to the foreign corporation 
simply because it failed to learn of the lawsuit in suffi-
cient time to appear and defend. 20 ALR2d 1186, 1189, 
Humphreys v. Idaho Gold Mines Development Co., 21 
Ida 126, 120 P. 823, 40 LRA NS 817. 
(e) Setting aside Plaintiffs' judgment would be in-
equitable under the circumstances. Setting aside a judg-
ment is an equitable matter. Equity will not intervene 
when the result would be inequitable to the other party. 
Cutler v. Haycock, 32 U. 354, 90 P. 897; Chrysler v. 
Chrysler, 5 U. (2d) 415, 303 P. 2d 995; Masters v. Le-
Seuer, 13 U. (2d) 293, 373 P.2d 573. The trial court is en-
dowed with considerable discretion in granting or deny-
ing a motion to set aside a default judgment. Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 U. (2d) 52, 376 P.2d 951. 
Where the trial court has ruled on a motion to vacate a 
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judgment the Supreme Court will reverse the trial court 
only where an abuse of discretion is clearly shown and 
where all elements were considered by the trial court. 
The Supreme Court will not reverse the trial court mere-
ly because the motion could have been granted. Warren 
v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 416, 260 P. 2d 741, 744; Aaron 
v. Holmes, 35 U. 49, 99 P. 450. 
Some of the reasons why it would be inequitable to the 
Plaintiffs for the Court to set aside their judgment are 
as follows: 
(1) Dr. Burke McArthur Snow, M.D. an Orthopedic 
Surgeon who treated and performed surgery upon both 
Plaintiffs is now dead and unavailable to testify. 
(2) Defendant delayed these proceedings by sleeping 
on his rights after learning of the judgment while suf-
ficient time remained for him to make timely application 
to set aside the judgment and has further delayed Plain-
tiffs by filing an untimely appeal. It has been over 4 years 
since Defendant caused the injuries and damages for 
which recovery is sought in this action and Plaintiffs 
have received nothing to assist them with payment of 
those damages. Defendant and his insurance carrier well 
knew that the accident had occurred, that Plaintiffs had 
suffered serious injuries therefrom and that Plaintiffs 
were unwilling to settle and were delaying filing a law-
suit until the extent of their injuries could be determined. 
Defendant does not come before the court with "clean 
hands" and accordingly is not entitled to equitable relief. 
(3) Judge Snow heard the evidence from the late Dr. 
Snow, heard the testimony of the Plaintiffs and was 
"fully advised" (R. 7) when he granted judgment in 
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favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant for an amount 
which seems extremely small in view of the extended 
period of treatment, the seriousness of the injuries, the 
surgical procedures required and yet to be required, the 
partial disability resulting from the injuries and the 
other factors well known to Judge Snow when he de-
termined the amount of the judgment to be awarded. The 
accident was a rear end collision and the question of 
liability is clear. No good purpose could be accomplished 
by granting a new trial. The appellant has not included 
a transcript of the arguments made before Judge Snow 
in support of his motion to vacate the judgment, or of the 
testimony taken by Judge Snow at the time the judgment 
was granted, therefore this Court would be simply guess-
ing if it attempted to determine the equities of Defend-
ant's case from the record now before the Court. 
(f) No abuse of discretion by Judge Snow has been 
shown. Whether a default judgment should be set aside, 
and the party aggrieved given opportunity to plead to 
merits, is a question that rests within the sound discre-
tion of the Court; and unless it is made to appear that 
this discretion has been abused, rulings of trial court on 
matter of this kind will not be disturbed on appeal. Aaron 
v. Holmes, 35 U. 49, 99 P. 450, Mayhew v. Standard Gil-
sonite Co., 14 U. (2d) 52, 376 P. 2d 951, Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Co., 123 U. 416, 260 P.2d 741, 742. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PERFECT 
HIS APPEAL 
Rules 72 and 73, URCP, provide that an appeal may be 
taken from " ... all final judgments ... " within " ... 
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one month from the entry of the judgment appealed from 
... " No notice of appeal was filed after the entry of the 
order denying Defendant's motion to set aside the Plain-
tiffs' judgment in this case. Rule 73 (b) requires that the 
notice of appeal designate the judgment or part thereof 
appealed from. The purported notice of appeal filed in 
this matter by Defendant was filed April 19, 1965, a full 
7 days before the entry on April 26, 1965, of the order 
denying Defendant's motion. A purported appeal from a 
non-existent order cannot confer jurisdiction upon this 
Court. 
The time prescribed by said rules for filing an appeal 
is jurisdictional Allen v. Garner, 45 U. 39, 143 P. 228, 
Sorenson v. Korsgaard, 83 U. 177, 27 P. 2d 439. An appeal 
will be dismissed when not taken within the time allowed 
Blyth & Fargo Co. v. Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P. 1027. An 
appeal which was not taken within prescribed period 
after entry of judgment is ineffectual. Henderson v. 
Barnes, 27 U. 348, 75 P. 759. In the case of a belated entry 
of a judgment, the time within which an appeal may be 
taken runs from the actual entry of the judgment and 
such entry, for the purposes of an appeal, may not be 
considered as nunc pro tune entry. Lukich v. Utah Con-
struction Co., 48 U. 452, 160 P. 270. In discussing the pe-
riod included in the one month period during which an 
appeal can be taken from the entry of the judgment, this 
Court stated that such month commences at the begin-
ning of the day of the month on which it starts and ends 
at the expiration of the day before the same day of the 
next month, and that if it commenced on the 23rd day of 
a month that it would end at the expiration of the 22nd 
day of the following month. In re Lynch's Estate, 123 U. 
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57, 254 P. 2d 454. In Allred v. Wood, 72 U. 427, 270 P. 
1089 this Court held that when a decree is entered under 
Code 1953, 30-3-6, it is final for the purposes of an ap-
peal, and the six-month period prescribed by this section 
begins to run from that time. In Fausett v. General Elec-
tric Contracts Corp, 112 P. 2d 140, 100 U 259, 144 P. 2d 
205, 100 U. 265 this Court in considering a motion to dis-
miss an alleged pre-mature appeal which was filed after 
denial of motion for a new trial and before a motion to 
re-tax costs was argued, seemed to recognize that if the 
appeal were in fact pre-mature that it should be dis-
missed, but held that since inclusion of cost did not affect 
the finality of a judgment that the appeal was not in fact 
premature. 
The rule seems to be well settled that the Supreme 
Court is without jurisdiction to hear a pre-mature appeal. 
4 Am Jur 2d 301, 302. Some of the cases which have con-
sidered this matter are as follows: 
The want of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over a 
pre-mature appeal is absolute, and the defect cannot be 
waived since consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Phillips 
v. Phillips, 264 P. 2d 926, 41 Cal. 2d 869, Wells v. State 
(Fla) 38 So. 2d 464, Re Pringle, 51 Wyo 352, 67 P.2d 204, 
110 ALR 987. 
Generally, an appellant court is without jurisdiction 
over an appeal taken before the date of entry of judg-
ment and where notice of appeal was filed with superior 
court prior to filing of judgment, appeal would be dis-
missed as premature. 
Consolidated Stage Co. v. Corp. Commission, 182 P. 2d 
937, 66 Ariz. 75. 
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An appeal may be premature when the order appealed 
from, although dispositive of the issues, has not been 
formally entered in final form. Brown v. Adler, 282 Mich. 
264, 276 NW 442, West v. Lysle, 302 Pa 147, 153 A 131. 
A minute entry order dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint 
was not a "judgment" from which an appeal could be 
taken and an appeal from such an order was pre-mature. 
Sproul v. Cuddy, 263 P. 2d 92, 121 C. A. 2d 197. 
Plaintiffs' cross-assignment contending that trial court 
erred in granting a nonsuit as to one of the Defendant's 
was not properly before the Supreme Court on appeal 
where no final judgment had been entered as to such De-
fendant. Stucki v. Ellis, 201 P. 2d 486, 114 U. 486. 
CONCLUSION 
The Legislature enacted the statute providing for serv-
ice of process upon a non-resident motorist who was in-
volved in an accident while driving on the Utah High-
ways. Plaintiffs were injured by the Defendant who was 
then a non-resident motorist within the meaning of that 
statute and Plaintiffs recovered a modest judgment 
against Defendant by proceding strictly in accordance 
with requirements of that statute and presenting the 
testimony of a physician who is now dead. Defendant now 
asks that he be excused from the consequences of his 
inexcusable neglect in failing to make provision for the 
settlement of the damages that he had caused, his inex-
cusable neglect in not providing Plaintiffs with his cur-
rent address and his inexcusable neglect in delaying ap· 
proximately 52 days after he learned that a judgment 
had been entered before he filed a motion to set aside 
15 
Plaintiffs' judgment under the circumstances would be 
to read an actual notice requirement into the non-resident 
motorist statute in which the legislature saw fit not to 
require actual notice to the non-resident. Judge Snow 
heard the witnesses and evidence before he entered judg-
ment and exercised his discretion by refusing to set aside 
the judgment after leaving extensive argument in sup-
port of Defendant's motion. The discretion of this Court 
should not be substituted for the discretion vested in the 
trial court. Judge Snow not only did not abuse his dis-
cretion but exercised it wisely after careful consideration 
of all of the facts. Defendant did not see fit to include in 
his record a transcript of the judgment hearing or of the 
hearing on his motion to set aside the judgment and he 
now asks this Court to believe that Judge Snow abused 
his discretion when the facts upon which Judge Snow 
based his decision are not even before this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMI'ITED, 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
